## Add Taskfile for unified dev workflow
### Summary
- Introduces [Taskfile](https://taskfile.dev/) as the single CLI entry
point for all development workflows across backend, frontend, engine,
Docker, and desktop
- ~80 tasks organized into 6 namespaces: `backend:`, `frontend:`,
`engine:`, `docker:`, `desktop:`, plus root-level composites
- All CI workflows migrated to use Task
- Deletes `engine/Makefile` and `scripts/build-tauri-jlink.{sh,bat}` —
replaced by Task equivalents
- Removes redundant npm scripts (`dev`, `build`, `prep`, `lint`, `test`,
`typecheck:all`) from `package.json`
- Smart dependency caching: `sources`/`status`/`generates`
fingerprinting, CI-aware `npm ci` vs `npm install`, `run: once` for
parallel dep deduplication
### What this does NOT do
- Does not replace Gradle, npm, or Docker — Taskfile is a thin
orchestration wrapper
- Does not change application code or behavior
### Install
```
npm install -g @go-task/cli # or: brew install go-task, winget install Task.Task
```
### Quick start
```
task --list # discover all tasks
task install # install all deps
task dev # start backend + frontend
task dev:all # also start AI engine
task test # run all tests
task check # quick quality gate (local dev)
task check:all # full CI quality gate
```
### Test plan
- [ ] Install `task` CLI and run `task --list` — verify all tasks
display
- [ ] Run `task install` — verify frontend + engine deps install
- [ ] Run `task dev` — verify backend + frontend start, Ctrl+C exits
cleanly
- [ ] Run `task frontend:check` — verify typecheck + lint + test pass
- [ ] Run `task desktop:dev` — verify jlink builds are cached on second
run
- [ ] Verify CI passes on all workflows
---------
Co-authored-by: James Brunton <jbrunton96@gmail.com>
Upgrade fastmcp, aiohttp, cryptography, and anthropic to fix critical
SSRF/path traversal, header injection, OAuth confused deputy, and DoS
vulnerabilities.
<details>
<summary>✅ 16 CVEs resolved by this upgrade, including 2 critical 🚨
CVEs</summary>
<br>
This PR will resolve the following CVEs:
| Issue |
Severity |
Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
|
<pre>[CVE-2026-32871](https://app.aikido.dev/issues/25944204/detail?groupId=70007#CVE-2026-32871)</pre>
| <pre>🚨 CRITICAL</pre> | [fastmcp] Path traversal vulnerability in URL
construction allows attackers to bypass API prefix restrictions and
access arbitrary backend endpoints using unencoded path parameters,
enabling authenticated SSRF attacks. |
|
<pre>[CVE-2026-27124](https://app.aikido.dev/issues/25944204/detail?groupId=70007#CVE-2026-27124)</pre>
| <pre>HIGH</pre> | [fastmcp] OAuthProxy fails to validate user consent
when receiving authorization codes from GitHub, allowing attackers to
exploit GitHub's consent-skipping behavior to gain unauthorized access
to FastMCP servers through a Confused Deputy attack. |
|
<pre>[CVE-2025-64340](https://app.aikido.dev/issues/25944204/detail?groupId=70007#CVE-2025-64340)</pre>
| <pre>MEDIUM</pre> | [fastmcp] Server names with shell metacharacters
can cause command injection on Windows when passed to install commands,
allowing arbitrary code execution through cmd.exe interpretation of .cmd
wrapper files. |
|
<pre>[CVE-2026-34520](https://app.aikido.dev/issues/25944198/detail?groupId=70007#CVE-2026-34520)</pre>
| <pre>🚨 CRITICAL</pre> | [aiohttp] is an asynchronous HTTP
client/server framework for asyncio and Python. Prior to version 3.13.4,
the C parser (the default for most installs) accepted null bytes and
control characters in response headers. This issue has been patched in
version 3.13.4. |
|
<pre>[CVE-2026-34516](https://app.aikido.dev/issues/25944198/detail?groupId=70007#CVE-2026-34516)</pre>
| <pre>HIGH</pre> | [aiohttp] A response with an excessive number of
multipart headers can consume more memory than intended, leading to a
denial of service (DoS) vulnerability through resource exhaustion. |
|
<pre>[CVE-2026-22815](https://app.aikido.dev/issues/25944198/detail?groupId=70007#CVE-2026-22815)</pre>
| <pre>MEDIUM</pre> | [aiohttp] is an asynchronous HTTP client/server
framework for asyncio and Python. Prior to version 3.13.4, insufficient
restrictions in header/trailer handling could cause uncapped memory
usage. This issue has been patched in version 3.13.4. |
|
<pre>[CVE-2026-34515](https://app.aikido.dev/issues/25944198/detail?groupId=70007#CVE-2026-34515)</pre>
| <pre>MEDIUM</pre> | [aiohttp] is an asynchronous HTTP client/server
framework for asyncio and Python. Prior to version 3.13.4, on Windows
the static resource handler may expose information about a NTLMv2 remote
path. This issue has been patched in version 3.13.4. |
|
<pre>[CVE-2026-34525](https://app.aikido.dev/issues/25944198/detail?groupId=70007#CVE-2026-34525)</pre>
| <pre>MEDIUM</pre> | [aiohttp] is an asynchronous HTTP client/server
framework for asyncio and Python. Prior to version 3.13.4, multiple Host
headers were allowed in aiohttp. This issue has been patched in version
3.13.4. |
|
<pre>[CVE-2026-34513](https://app.aikido.dev/issues/25944198/detail?groupId=70007#CVE-2026-34513)</pre>
| <pre>LOW</pre> | [aiohttp] is an asynchronous HTTP client/server
framework for asyncio and Python. Prior to version 3.13.4, an unbounded
DNS cache could result in excessive memory usage possibly resulting in a
DoS situation. This issue has been patched in version 3.13.4. |
|
<pre>[CVE-2026-34514](https://app.aikido.dev/issues/25944198/detail?groupId=70007#CVE-2026-34514)</pre>
| <pre>LOW</pre> | [aiohttp] is an asynchronous HTTP client/server
framework for asyncio and Python. Prior to version 3.13.4, an attacker
who controls the content_type parameter in aiohttp could use this to
inject extra headers or similar exploits. This issue has been patched in
version 3.13.4. |
|
<pre>[CVE-2026-34517](https://app.aikido.dev/issues/25944198/detail?groupId=70007#CVE-2026-34517)</pre>
| <pre>LOW</pre> | [aiohttp] is an asynchronous HTTP client/server
framework for asyncio and Python. Prior to version 3.13.4, for some
multipart form fields, aiohttp read the entire field into memory before
checking client_max_size. This issue has been patched in version 3.13.4.
|
|
<pre>[CVE-2026-34518](https://app.aikido.dev/issues/25944198/detail?groupId=70007#CVE-2026-34518)</pre>
| <pre>LOW</pre> | [aiohttp] When following redirects to a different
origin, the framework fails to drop the Cookie and Proxy-Authorization
headers alongside the Authorization header, potentially leaking
sensitive authentication credentials to untrusted domains. |
|
<pre>[CVE-2026-34519](https://app.aikido.dev/issues/25944198/detail?groupId=70007#CVE-2026-34519)</pre>
| <pre>LOW</pre> | [aiohttp] is an asynchronous HTTP client/server
framework for asyncio and Python. Prior to version 3.13.4, an attacker
who controls the reason parameter when creating a Response may be able
to inject extra headers or similar exploits. This issue has been patched
in version 3.13.4. |
|
<pre>[CVE-2026-39892](https://app.aikido.dev/issues/25637201/detail?groupId=70007#CVE-2026-39892)</pre>
| <pre>MEDIUM</pre> | [cryptography] Non-contiguous buffers passed to
cryptographic APIs can cause buffer overflows, potentially leading to
memory corruption and arbitrary code execution. |
|
<pre>[CVE-2026-34452](https://app.aikido.dev/issues/25944200/detail?groupId=70007#CVE-2026-34452)</pre>
| <pre>MEDIUM</pre> | [anthropic] A time-of-check-time-of-use (TOCTOU)
vulnerability in the async filesystem memory tool allows local attackers
to escape the sandbox directory via symlink manipulation, enabling
arbitrary file read/write operations outside the intended memory
directory. |
|
<pre>[CVE-2026-34450](https://app.aikido.dev/issues/25944200/detail?groupId=70007#CVE-2026-34450)</pre>
| <pre>MEDIUM</pre> | [anthropic] The local filesystem memory tool
created world-readable and potentially world-writable files, allowing
local attackers to read persisted agent state or modify memory files to
influence model behavior. |
</details>
Co-authored-by: aikido-autofix[bot] <119856028+aikido-autofix[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
# Description of Changes
Add Java orchestration layer which can connect and go back and forth
with the AI engine to get results for the user. It's expected that the
AI engine will not be publicly available and this Java layer will always
be in front of it, to manage sessions and auth etc.
# Description of Changes
Redesign the Python AI engine to be properly agentic and make use of
`pydantic-ai` instead of `langchain` for correctness and ergonomics.
This should be a good foundation for us to build our AI engine on going
forwards.
