In order to stop privilege escalation via
`/api/admin/projects/:project/users/:userId/roles` and
`/api/admin/projects/:project/groups/:groupId/roles` this PR adds the
same check we added to setAccess methods to the methods updating access
for these two methods.
Also adds tests that verify that we throw an exception if you try to
assign roles you do not have.
Thank you @nunogois for spotting this during testing.
So, since our assumption about client instances ended up being wrong (or, less than stable).
This PR moves the EdgeUpgradeBanner to be displayed if the featureflag
displayEdgeBanner is enabled. That way, if customers comes back and says
they have upgraded but still get the banner, we can remove them from the
segment.
## About the changes
When edge is configured to automatically generate tokens, it requires
the token to be present in all unleash instances.
It's behind a flag which enables us to turn it on on a case by case
scenario.
The risk of this implementation is that we'd be adding load to the
database in the middleware that evaluates tokens (which are present in
mostly all our API calls. We only query when the token is missing but
because the /client and /frontend endpoints which will be the affected
ones are high throughput, we want to be extra careful to avoid DDoSing
ourselves
## Alternatives:
One alternative would be that we merge the two endpoints into one.
Currently, Edge does the following:
If the token is not valid, it tries to create a token using a service
account token and /api/admin/create-token endpoint. Then it uses the
token generated (which is returned from the prior endpoint) to query
/api/frontend. What if we could call /api/frontend with the same service
account we use to create the token? It may sound risky but if the same
application holding the service account token with permission to create
a token, can call /api/frontend via the generated token, shouldn't it be
able to call the endpoint directly?
The purpose of the token is authentication and authorization. With the
two tokens we are authenticating the same app with 2 different
authorization scopes, but because it's the same app we are
authenticating, can't we just use one token and assume that the app has
both scopes?
If the service account already has permissions to create a token and
then use that token for further actions, allowing it to directly call
/api/frontend does not necessarily introduce new security risks. The
only risk is allowing the app to generate new tokens. Which leads to the
third alternative: should we just remove this option from edge?
Since we're polling for updates to max revision id every second, and
listening for update events for revision id in the proxy repository then
running a refresh interval of 20secs in the proxy repo refresh seems
excessive.
This PR changes the frequency of the refresh to once per 45mins.
This PR adds a property issues to application schema, and also adds all
the missing features that have been reported by SDK, but do not exist in
Unleash.
Adds a migration to create and fill the `project_metrics_summary_trends`
This table is to be used in enterprise to update the metrics data daily
per project (after the aggregation of the hourly data)
Driving force for this was doing performance testing on the executive
dashboard.
This will allow to remove the expensive query to aggregate the data on
demand and will drop the total response time from 2.5sec to 125ms
(measurements done with 100 Projects, 10000 features and over 1M rows in
`client_metrics_env_daily`
Closes #
[1-2080](https://linear.app/unleash/issue/1-2080/create-the-project-metrics-summary-trends-table)
---------
Signed-off-by: andreas-unleash <andreas@getunleash.ai>
Follow up to: https://github.com/Unleash/unleash/pull/6298
We no longer need this table, since it was superseded by `action_events`
and is no longer used.
I believe it's safe to drop this table right away since the feature is
not being used yet.
https://linear.app/unleash/issue/2-1962/implement-new-action-events-logic
Adds a new `action_set_events` table for the new action events logic.
Even though observable events are technically immutable, we're storing
the observable event along with the action set event. This allows us to
avoid 1 join while allowing us to persist action set event information
after deleting observable events, if we wish to do so at a later stage.
In order to prevent users from being able to assign roles/permissions
they don't have, this PR adds a check that the user performing the
action either is Admin, Project owner or has the same role they are
trying to grant/add.
This addAccess method is only used from Enterprise, so there will be a
separate PR there, updating how we return the roles list for a user, so
that our frontend can only present the roles a user is actually allowed
to grant.
This adds the validation to the backend to ensure that even if the
frontend thinks we're allowed to add any role to any user here, the
backend can be smart enough to stop it.
We should still update frontend as well, so that it doesn't look like we
can add roles we won't be allowed to.
## About the changes
Our frontend API creates new instances of unleash-client-proxy. Because
this is by-design, we don't want to log a warning that was designed to
warn users about potential misconfiguration of Unleash Proxy.
As an extra, I'm renaming ProxyController to FrontendAPIController to
better reflect the intent of this controller.
## About the changes
This is a rough initial version as a PoC for a permission matrix.
This is only available after enabling the flag `userAccessUIEnabled`
that is set to true by default in local development.
The access was added to the users' admin page but could be embedded in
different contexts (e.g. when assigning a role to a user):
![image](https://github.com/Unleash/unleash/assets/455064/3f541f46-99bb-409b-a0fe-13f5d3f9572a)
This is how the matrix looks like
![screencapture-localhost-3000-admin-users-3-access-2024-02-13-12_15_44](https://github.com/Unleash/unleash/assets/455064/183deeb6-a0dc-470f-924c-f435c6196407)
---------
Co-authored-by: Nuno Góis <github@nunogois.com>
Fixes ##5799 and #5785
When you do not provide a token we should resolve to the "default"
environment to maintain backward compatibility. If you actually provide
a token we should prefer that and even block the request if it is not
valid.
An interesting fact is that "default" environment is not available on a
fresh installation of Unleash. This means that you need to provide a
token to actually get access to toggle configurations.
---------
Co-authored-by: Thomas Heartman <thomas@getunleash.io>
Created a build script that generates orval schemas with automatic
cleanup. Also generating new ones.
1. yarn gen:api **(generates schemas)**
2. rm -rf src/openapi/apis **(remove apis)**
3. sed -i '1q' src/openapi/index.ts **(remove all rows except first)**
This change takes the (now rather involved) type used to send CR
schedule suspension emails and extracts it into a proper exported type.
This will allow us to import it in enterprise as well instead of
redefining it.
## About the changes
Implements a new store for collected traffic data usage that connects to
the new table `stat_traffic_data` primary key'd on [day, trafficGroup,
status_code_series].
Day being a date
Traffic group being which endpoint is being counted for, ie /api/admin,
/api/frontend etc
Status code series grouping 2xx status responses and 304 into their
respective 200 / 300 series.
No service here, this is for pro/enterprise
This PR adds an endpoint to Unleash that accepts an error message and
option error stack and logs it as an error. This allows us to leverage
errors in logs observability to catch UI errors consistently.
Considered a test, but this endpoint only accepts and logs input, so I'm
not sure how useful it would be.