To check that users do indeed have permissions to update the roles from
project-service, we've been depending on req.user.id.
We had one error on Friday March 8th, where we managed to send
undefined/null to a method that requires a number. This PR assumes that
if we have an API token, and we have admin permissions and userId is not
set we're a legacy admin token.
It uses the util method for extractUserId(req: IAuthRequest | IApiRequest), so if we've passed through the apiTokenMiddleware first, we'll have userId -42, if we haven't, we'll get -1337.
In order to stop privilege escalation via
`/api/admin/projects/:project/users/:userId/roles` and
`/api/admin/projects/:project/groups/:groupId/roles` this PR adds the
same check we added to setAccess methods to the methods updating access
for these two methods.
Also adds tests that verify that we throw an exception if you try to
assign roles you do not have.
Thank you @nunogois for spotting this during testing.
In order to prevent users from being able to assign roles/permissions
they don't have, this PR adds a check that the user performing the
action either is Admin, Project owner or has the same role they are
trying to grant/add.
This addAccess method is only used from Enterprise, so there will be a
separate PR there, updating how we return the roles list for a user, so
that our frontend can only present the roles a user is actually allowed
to grant.
This adds the validation to the backend to ensure that even if the
frontend thinks we're allowed to add any role to any user here, the
backend can be smart enough to stop it.
We should still update frontend as well, so that it doesn't look like we
can add roles we won't be allowed to.
